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Abstract
Non-malleable codes were introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (JACM 2018)
as a generalization of standard error correcting codes to handle severe forms of tampering
on codewords. This notion has attracted a lot of recent research, resulting in various explicit
constructions, which have found applications in tamper-resilient cryptography and connections
to other pseudorandom objects in theoretical computer science.
We continue the line of investigation on explicit constructions of non-malleable codes in the
information theoretic setting, and give explicit constructions for several new classes of tampering
functions. These classes strictly generalize several previously studied classes of tampering func-
tions, and in particular extend the well studied split-state model which is a “compartmentalized”
model in the sense that the codeword is partitioned a prior into disjoint intervals for tampering.
Specifically, we give explicit non-malleable codes for the following classes of tampering functions.
• Interleaved split-state tampering: Here the codeword is partitioned in an unknown way
by an adversary, and then tampered with by a split-state tampering function.
• Linear function composed with split-state tampering: In this model, the codeword is first
tampered with by a split-state adversary, and then the whole tampered codeword is further
tampered with by a linear function. In fact our results are stronger, and we can handle
linear function composed with interleaved split-state tampering.
• Bounded communication split-state tampering: In this model, the two split-state tamper-
ing adversaries are allowed to participate in a communication protocol with a bounded
communication budget.
Our results are the first explicit constructions of non-malleable codes in any of these tamper-
ing models. We derive all these results from explicit constructions of seedless non-malleable
extractors, which we believe are of independent interest.
Using our techniques, we also give an improved seedless extractor for an unknown interleaving
of two independent sources.
∗Part of this work was done when the author was a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Advanced Study,
Princeton, partially supported by NSF Grant CCF-1412958 and the Simons Foundation.
†Partially supported by NSF Grant CCF-1617713.
1 Introduction
1.1 Non-malleable Codes
Non-malleable codes were introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs [DPW18] as an elegant
relaxation and generalization of standard error correcting codes, where the motivation is to handle
much larger classes of tampering functions on the codeword. Traditionally, error correcting codes
only provide meaningful guarantees (e.g., unique decoding or list-decoding) when part of the code-
word is modified (i.e., the modified codeword is close in Hamming distance to an actual codeword),
whereas in practice an adversary can possibly use much more complicated functions to modify the
entire codeword. In the latter case, it is easy to see that error correction or even error detection
becomes generally impossible, for example an adversary can simply change all codewords into a
fixed string. On the other hand, non-malleable codes can still provide useful guarantees here, and
thus partially bridge this gap. Informally, a non-malleable code guarantees that after tampering,
the decoding either correctly gives the original message or gives a message that is completely unre-
lated and independent of the original message. This captures the notion of non-malleability: that
an adversary cannot modify the codeword in a way such that the tampered codeword decodes back
to a related but different message.
The original intended application of non-malleable codes is in tamper-resilient cryptography
[DPW18], where they can be used generally to prevent an adversary from learning secret informa-
tion by observing the input/output behavior of modified ciphertexts. Subsequently, non-malleable
codes have found applications in non-malleable commitments [GPR16], public-key encryptions
[CMTV15], non-malleable secret sharing schemes [GK18a,GK18b], and privacy amplification pro-
tocols [CKOS18]. Furthermore, interesting connections were found to non-malleable extractors
[CG14b], and very recently to spectral expanders [RS18]. Along the way, the constructions of
non-malleable codes used various components and sophisticated ideas from additive combinatorics
[ADL14,CZ14] and randomness extraction [CGL16], and some of these techniques have also found
applications in constructing extractors for independent sources [Li17]. Until today, non-malleable
codes have become fundamental objects at the intersection of coding theory and cryptography.
They are well deserved to be studied in more depth in their own right, as well as to find more
connections to other well studied objects in theoretical computer science.
We first introduce some notation before formally defining non-malleable codes.
Definition 1.1. For any function f : S → S, f has a fixed point at s ∈ S if f(s) = s. We say
f has no fixed points in T ⊆ S, if f(t) 6= t for all t ∈ T . f has no fixed points if f(s) 6= s for all
s ∈ S.
Definition 1.2 (Tampering functions). For any n > 0, let Fn denote the set of all functions
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. Any subset of Fn is a family of tampering functions.
We use the statistical distance to measure the distance between distributions.
Definition 1.3. The statistical distance between two distributions D1 and D2 over some universal
set Ω is defined as |D1 − D2| = 12
∑
d∈Ω |Pr[D1 = d] −Pr[D2 = d]|. We say D1 is ǫ-close to D2 if
|D1 −D2| ≤ ǫ and denote it by D1 ≈ǫ D2.
To handle fixed points, we need to define the following function.
copy(x, y) =
{
x if x 6= same⋆
y if x = same⋆
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Following the treatment in [DPW18], we first define coding schemes.
Definition 1.4 (Coding schemes). Let Enc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n and Dec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥}
be functions such that Enc is a randomized function (i.e., it has access to private randomness) and
Dec is a deterministic function. We say that (Enc,Dec) is a coding scheme with block length n and
message length k if for all s ∈ {0, 1}k, Pr[Dec(Enc(s)) = s] = 1, where the probability is taken over
the randomness in Enc.
We can now define non-malleable codes.
Definition 1.5 (Non-malleable codes). A coding scheme C = (Enc,Dec) with block length n and
message length k is a non-malleable code with respect to a family of tampering functions F ⊂ Fn
and error ǫ if for every f ∈ F there exists a random variable Df on {0, 1}k ∪ {same⋆} which is
independent of the randomness in Enc such that for all messages s ∈ {0, 1}k, it holds that
|Dec(f(Enc(s)))− copy(Df , s)| ≤ ǫ.
We say the code is explicit if both the encoding and decoding can be done in polynomial time. The
rate of C is given by k/n.
Relevant prior work on non-malleable codes. There has been a lot of exciting research on
non-malleable codes, and we do not even attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of them.
Instead we focus on relevant explicit constructions in the information theoretic setting, which is
also the focus of this paper. One of the most studied classes of tampering functions is the so called
split-state tampering, where the codeword is divided into (at least two) disjoint intervals and the
adversary can tamper with each interval arbitrarily but independently. This model arises naturally
in situations where the codeword may be stored in different parts of memory or different devices.
Following a very successful line of work [DKO13,ADL14,CG14b,CZ14,ADKO15,CGL16,Li17,Li18],
we now have explicit constructions of non-malleable codes in the 2-split state model with constant
rate and constant error, or rate Ω(log log n/ log n) with exponentially small error [Li18]. For larger
number of states, recent work of Kanukurthi, Obbattu, and Sruthi [KOS17], and that of Gupta,
Maji and Wang [GMW18] gave explicit constructions in the 4-split-state model and 3-split-state
model respectively, with constant rate and negligible error.
The split state model is a “compartmentalized” model, where the codeword is partitioned a
prior into disjoint intervals for tampering. Recently, there has been progress towards handling
non-compartmentalized tampering functions. A work of Agrawal, Gupta, Maji, Pandey and Prab-
hakaran [AGM+15] gave explicit constructions of non-malleable codes with respect to tampering
functions that permute or flip the bits of the codeword. Ball, Dachman-Soled, Kulkarni and Malkin
[BDKM16] gave explicit constructions of non-malleable codes against t-local functions for t ≤ n1−ǫ.
However in all these models, each bit of the tampering function only depends on part of the
codeword. A recent work of Chattopadhyay and Li [CL17] gave the first explicit constructions
of non-malleable codes where each bit of the tampering function may depend on all bits of the
codeword. Specifically, they gave constructions for the classes of linear functions and small-depth
(unbounded fain-in) circuits. The rate of the non-malleable code with respect to small-depth cir-
cuits was exponentially improved by a subsequent work of Ball, Dachman-Soled, Guo, Malkin, and
Tan [BDG+18].
Given all these exciting results, a major goal of the research on non-malleable codes remains to
give explicit constructions for broader classes of tampering functions, as one can use the probabilistic
method to show the existence of non-malleable codes with rate close to 1 − δ for any class F of
tampering functions with |F| ≤ 22δn [CG14a].
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Our results. We continue the line of investigation on explicit constructions of non-malleable
codes, and give explicit constructions for several new classes of non-compartmentalized tampering
functions, where in some classes each bit of the tampering function can depend on all the bits of
the codeword. The new classes strictly generalize several previous studied classes of tampering
functions. In particular, we consider the following three classes.
1. Interleaved 2-split-state tampering , where the adversary can divide the codeword into two
arbitrary disjoint intervals and tamper with each interval arbitrarily but independently. This
model generalizes the split-state model and captures the situation where the codeword is
partitioned into two halves in an unknown way by the adversary before applying a 2-split-state
tampering function. Constructing non-malleable codes for this class of tampering functions
was left as an open problem by Cheraghchi and Guruswami [CG14b].
2. Composition of tampering , where the adversary takes two tampering functions and compose
them together to get a new tampering function. We note that function composition is a natural
strategy for an adversary to achieve more powerful tampering, and it has been studied widely
in other fields (e.g., computational complexity and communication complexity). Thus we
believe that studying non-malleable codes for the composition of known classes of tampering
functions is also a natural and important direction.
3. Bounded communication 2-split-state tampering , where the two tampering functions in a 2-
split state model are allowed to have some bounded communication.
We now formally define these classes and some related classes below. We use the notation that for
any permutation π : [n]→ [n] and any string x ∈ [r]n, y = xπ denotes the length n string such that
yπ(i) = xi.
• The family of 2-split-state functions 2SS ⊂ F2n: Any f ∈ 2SS comprises of two functions
f1 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and f2 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and for any x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, f(x, y) = (f1(x),
f2(x)). This family of tampering functions has been extensively studied, with a long line of
work achieving near optimal explicit constructions of non-malleable codes.
• The family of linear functions Lin ⊂ Fn: Any f ∈ Lin is a linear function from {0, 1}n to
{0, 1}n (viewing {0, 1}n as Fn2 ).
• The family of interleaved 2-split-state functions 2ISS ⊂ F2n: Any f ∈ 2ISS comprises of two
functions f1 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, f2 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and a permutation π : [2n] → [2n].
For any z = (x ◦ y)π ∈ {0, 1}2n, where x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, let f(z) = (f1(x) ◦ f2(y))π (where ◦
denotes the string concatenation operation).
• The family of bounded communication 2-split-state functions (2, t) − CSS: Consider the fol-
lowing natural extension of the 2-split-state model. Let c = (x, y) be a codeword in {0, 1}2n,
where x is the first n bits of c and y is the remaining n bits of c. Let Alice and Bob be two
tampering adversaries, where Alice has access to x and Bob has access to y. Alice and Bob
run a (deterministic) communication protocol based on x and y respectively, which can last
for an arbitrary number of rounds but each party sends at most t bits in total. Finally, based
on the transcript and x Alice outputs x′ ∈ {0, 1}n, similarly based on the transcript and y
Bob outputs y′ ∈ {0, 1}n. The tampered codeword is c′ = (x′, y′).
• For any tampering function families F ,G ⊂ Fn, define the family F ◦ G ⊂ Fn to be the set of
all functions of the form f ◦ g, where f ∈ F , g ∈ G and ◦ denotes function composition.
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We now formally state our results. Our main result is an explicit non-malleable code with
respect to the tampering class of Lin ◦ 2ISS, i.e, linear function composed with interleaved 2-split-
state tampering. Specifically, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. There exists a constant δ > 0 such that for all integers n > 0 there exists an explicit
non-malleable code with respect to Lin ◦ 2ISS with rate 1/nδ and error 2−nδ .
This immediately gives the following corollaries, which give explicit non-malleable codes for
interleaved 2-split-state tampering, and linear function composed with 2-split-state tampering.
Corollary 2. There exists a constant δ > 0 such that for all integers n > 0 there exists an explicit
non-malleable code with respect to 2ISS with rate 1/nδ and error 2−nδ .
Corollary 3. There exists a constant δ > 0 such that for all integers n > 0 there exists an explicit
non-malleable code with respect to Lin ◦ 2SS with rate 1/nδ and error 2−nδ .
Next we give an explicit non-malleable code with respect to bounded communication 2-split-
state tampering.
Theorem 4. There exists a constant δ > 0 such that for all integers n, t > 0 with t ≤ δn, there
exists an explicit non-malleable code with respect to (2, t) − CSS with rate Ω(log log n/ log n) and
error 2−Ω(n log logn/ logn).
Prior to our work, no explicit non-malleable code of any rate was known for these tampering classes.
1.2 Seedless non-malleable extractors
Our results on non-malleable codes are based on new constructions of seedless non-malleable extrac-
tors, which we believe are of independent interest. Before defining seedless non-malleable extractors
formally, we first recall some basic notation from the area of randomness extraction.
Randomness extraction is motivated by the problem of purifying imperfect (or defective) sources
of randomness. The concern stems from the fact that natural random sources often have poor qual-
ity, while most applications require high quality (e.g., uniform) random bits. We use the standard
notion of min-entropy to measure the amount of randomness in a distribution.
Definition 1.6. The min-entropy H∞(X) of a probability distribution X is defined to be
minx(− log(Pr[X = x])). We say a probability distribution X on {0, 1}n is an (n,H∞(X))-source
and the min-entropy rate is H∞(X)/n.
It turns out that it is impossible to extract from a single general weak random source even for
min-entropy n − 1. There are two possible ways to bypass this barrier. The first one is to relax
the extractor to be a seeded extractor , which takes an additional independent short random seed
to extract from a weak random source. The second one is to construct deterministic extractors for
special classes of weak random sources.
Both kinds of extractors have been studied extensively. Recently, they have also been generalized
to stronger notions where the inputs to the extractor can be tampered with by an adversary.
Specifically, Dodis and Wichs [DW09] introduced the notion of seeded non-malleable extractor in
the context of privacy amplification against an active adversary. Informally, such an extractor
satisfies the stronger property that the output of the extractor is independent of the output of
the extractor on a tampered seed. Similarly, and more relevant to this paper, a seedless variant
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of non-malleable extractors was introduced by Cheraghchi and Guruswami [CG14b] as a way to
construct non-malleable codes. Apart from their original applications, both kinds of non-malleable
extractors are of independent interest. They are also related to each other and have applications
in constructions of extractors for independent sources [Li17].
We now define seedless non-malleable extractors. For simplicity, the definition here assumes
that the tampering function has no fixed points. See Section 3 for a more formal definition.
Definition 1.7 (Seedless non-malleable extractors). Let F ⊂ Fn be a family of tampering functions
such that no function in F has any fixed points. A function nmExt : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a seedless
(n,m, ǫ)-non-malleable extractor with respect to F and a class of sources X if for every distribution
X ∈ X and every tampering function f ∈ F ,
|nmExt(X),nmExt(f(X))−Um,nmExt(f(X))| ≤ ǫ.
Further, we say that nmExt is ǫ′-invertible, if there exists a polynomial time sampling algorithm
A that takes as input y ∈ {0, 1}m, and outputs a sample from a distribution that is ǫ′-close to the
uniform distribution on the set nmExt−1(y).
In the above definition, when the class of sources X is the distribution Un, we simply say that
nmExt is a seedless (n,m, ǫ)-non-malleable extractor with respect to F .
Relevant prior work on seedless non-malleable extractors. The first construction of seed-
less non-malleable extractors was given by Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [CZ14] with respect to
the class of 10-split-state tampering. Subsequently, a series of works starting with the work of Chat-
topadhyay, Goyal and Li [CGL16] gave explicit seedless non-malleable extractors for 2-split-state
tampering. The only known construction with respect to a class of tampering functions different
from split state tampering is the work of Chattopadhyay and Li [CL17], which gave explicit seedless
non-malleable extractors with respect to the tampering class Lin and small depth circuits. We note
that constructing explicit seedless non-malleable extractors with respect to 2ISS was also posed as
an open problem in [CG14b].
Our results. We give the first explicit constructions of seedless non-malleable extractors with
respect to the tampering classes Lin ◦ 2ISS and (2, t) − CSS. Note that the first construction
also directly implies non-malleable extractors with respect to the classes 2ISS and Lin ◦ 2SS. The
non-malleable extractors with respect to Lin ◦ 2ISS is a fundamentally new construction. The non-
malleable extractor with respect to (2, t)−CSS is obtained by showing a reduction to seedless non-
malleable extractors for 2SS, where excellent constructions are known (e.g., a recent construction
of Li [Li18]).
We now formally state our main results.
Theorem 5. For all n > 0 there exists an efficiently computable seedless (n, nΩ(1), 2−nΩ(1))-non-
malleable extractor with respect to Lin ◦ 2ISS, that is 2−nΩ(1)-invertible.
This immediately gives the following two corollaries.
Corollary 6. For all n > 0 there exists an efficiently computable seedless (n, nΩ(1), 2−nΩ(1))-non-
malleable extractor with respect to 2ISS, that is 2−n
Ω(1)
-invertible.
Corollary 7. For all n > 0 there exists an efficiently computable seedless (n, nΩ(1), 2−nΩ(1))-non-
malleable extractor with respect to Lin ◦ 2SS, that is 2−nΩ(1)-invertible.
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Next we give the non-malleable extractor with respect to (2, t) −CSS.
Theorem 8. There exists a constant δ > 0 such for all integers n, t > 0 with t ≤ δn, there exists an
efficiently computable seedless (n,Ω
(
n·(log logn)
logn
)
, 2−Ω(n log logn/ logn))-non-malleable extractor with
respect to (2, t) − CSS, that is 2−Ω(n log logn/ logn)-invertible.
We derive our results on non-malleable codes using the above explicit constructions of non-
malleable extractors. In particular we use the following theorem proved by Cheraghchi and Gu-
ruswami [CG14b] that connects non-malleable extractors and codes.
Theorem 1.8 ([CG14b]). Let nmExt : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be an efficient seedless (n,m, ǫ)-non-
malleable extractor with respect to a class of tampering functions F acting on {0, 1}n. Further
suppose nmExt is ǫ′-invertible.
Then there exists an efficient construction of a non-malleable code with respect to the tampering
family F with block length = n, relative rate mn and error 2mǫ+ ǫ′.
1.3 Extractors for interleaved sources
Our techniques also yield improved explicit constructions of extractors for interleaved sources, which
generalize extractors for independent sources in the following way: the inputs to the extractor are
samples from a few independent sources mixed (interleaved) in an unknown (but fixed) way. Raz
and Yehudayoff [RY11] showed that such extractors have applications in communication complex-
ity and proving lower bounds for arithmetic circuits. In a subsequent work, Chattopadhyay and
Zuckerman [CZ16b] showed that such extractors can also be used to construct extractors for certain
samplable sources, extending a line of work initiated by Trevisan and Vadhan [TV00]. We now
define interleaved sources formally.
Definition 1.9 (Interleaved Sources). Let X1, . . . ,Xr be arbitrary independent sources on {0, 1}n
and let π : [rn]→ [rn] be any permutation. Then Z = (X1 ◦ . . . ◦Xr)π is an r-interleaved source.
Relevant prior work on interleaved extractors. Raz and Yehudayoff [RY11] gave explicit
extractors for 2-interleaved sources when both the sources have min-entropy at least (1 − δ)n for
a tiny constant δ > 0. Their construction is based on techniques from additive combinatorics and
can output Ω(n) bits with exponentially small error. Subsequently, Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman
[CZ16b] constructed extractors for 2-interleaved sources where one source has entropy (1− γ)n for
a small constant γ > 0 and the other source has entropy Ω(log n). They achieve output length
O(log n) bits with error n−Ω(1).
A much better result (in terms of the min-entropy) is known if the extractor has access to an
interleaving of more sources. For a large enough constant C, Chattopadhyay and Li [CL16] gave an
explicit extractor for C-interleaved sources where each source has entropy k ≥ poly(log n). They
achieve output length kΩ(1) and error n−Ω(1).
Our results. Our main result is an explicit extractor for 2-interleaved sources where each source
has min-entropy at least 2n/3. The extractor outputs Ω(n) bits with error 2−n
Ω(1)
.
Theorem 9. For any constant δ > 0 and all integers n > 0, there exists an efficiently computable
function iℓExt : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}m, m = Ω(n), such that for any two independent sources X and
Y, each on n bits with min-entropy at least (2/3 + δ)n, and any permutation π : [2n]→ [2n],
|iℓExt((X ◦Y)π)−Um| ≤ 2−nΩ(1) .
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1.4 Open questions
Non-malleable codes for composition of function classes We gave efficient constructions
of non-malleable codes for the tampering class Lin ◦ 2SS (and more generally Lin ◦ ISS). Many
natural questions remain to be answered. For instance, one open problem is to efficiently construct
non-malleable codes for the tampering class 2SS ◦ Lin. It looks like one needs substantially new
ideas to give such constructions. More generally, for what other interesting classes of functins F and
G can we construct non-malleable codes for the composed class F ◦ G? Is it possible to efficiently
construct non-malleable codes for the tampering class F ◦G if we have efficient non-malleable codes
for the classes F and G?
Other applications for seedless non-malleable extractors The explicit seedless non-malleable
extractors that we construct satisfy strong pseudorandom properties. A natural question is to find
more applications of these non-malleable extractors in explicit constructions of other interesting
objects.
Improved seedless extractors We construct an extractor for 2-interleaved sources that works
for min-entropy rate 2/3. It is easy to verify that there exists extractors for sources with min-entropy
as low as C log n, and a natural question here is to come up with such explicit constructions. Given
the success in constructing 2-source extractors for low min-entropy [CZ16a,Li18], we are hopeful
that more progress can be made on this problem.
1.5 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We use Section 2 to present an overview of our
results and techniques. We use Section 3 to introduce some background and notation. We present
our seedless non-malleable extractor construction with respect to Lin ◦ 2ISS in Section 4. We
use Section 5 to present our non-malleable extractor construction with respect to (2, t) − CSS.
We present efficient sampling algorithms for our seedless non-malleable extractor constructions in
Section 6. We use Section 7 to present an explicit construction of an extractor for interleaved
sources.
2 Overview of constructions and techniques
Our results on non-malleable codes are derived from explicit constructions of invertible seedless
non-malleable extractors (see Theorem 1.8). In this section, we focus on explicit constructions of
seedless non-malleable extractors with respect to the relevant classes of tampering functions, and
explicit extractors for interleaved sources.
Seedless non-malleable extractors with respect to Lin◦2ISS. We construct a seedless non-
malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, m = nΩ(1) such that the following hold:
Let X and Y be two independent uniform sources, each on n bits. Let h : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}2n be
an arbitrary linear function, f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be two arbitrary functions,
and π : [2n]→ [2n] be an arbitrary permutation. Then,
nmExt((X,Y)π),nmExt(h((f(X) ◦ g(Y))π)) ≈ǫ Um,nmExt(h((f(X) ◦ g(Y))π)),
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where ǫ = 2−n
Ω(1)
. Notice that such an extractor is not possible to construct in general, for example
when all f, g, h are the identify function. However, such an extractor exists when the composed
function does not have fixed points. For simplicity, we ignore this issue related to fixed points
in the proof sketch, and just mention that we have a reduction from the problem of constructing
non-malleable codes to the problem of constructing a non-malleable extractor with no fixed points.
The argument is similar to the argument in [CG14b] but more complicated since here we are dealing
with more powerful adversaries. We refer the reader to Section 4 for more details.
Our first step is to reduce the problem of constructing non-malleable codes with respect to
Lin ◦ 2ISS to constructing non-malleable extractors with the following guarantee. For strings x,
y ∈ {0, 1}n, we use x+ y (or equivalently x− y) to denote the bit-wise xor of the two strings. Let
X and Y to be two independent (n, n − nδ)-sources and f1, f2, g1, g2 ∈ Fn be four functions that
satisfy the following condition:
• ∀x ∈ support(X) and y ∈ support(Y), f1(x) + g1(y) 6= x or
• ∀x ∈ support(X) and y ∈ support(Y), f2(x) + g2(y) 6= y.
Then,
|nmExt((X,Y)π),nmExt((f1(X) + g1(Y), f2(X) + g2(Y))π)−
Um,nmExt((f1(X) + g1(Y), f2(X) + g2(Y))π)| ≤ 2−nΩ(1) .
The reduction can be seen in the following way: Define x = (x, 0n)π and y = (0
n, y)π. Similarly
define f(x) = h((f(x), 0n)π) and g(y) = h((0
n, g(y))π). Thus, (x, y)π = x+y and h((f(x), g(y))π) =
f(x)+ g(y). Define functions h1 : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n and h2 : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n such that h((f(x),
g(y))π) = (h1(x, y), h2(x, y))π. Since h((f(x), g(y))π) = f(x) + g(y), it follows that there exists
functions f1, g1, f2, g2 ∈ Fn such that for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, the following hold:
• h1(x, y) = f1(x) + g1(y), and
• h2(x, y) = f2(x) + g2(y).
Thus, h((f(x), g(y))π) = ((f1(x) + g1(y)), (f2(x) + g2(y)))π. The loss of entropy in X and Y in the
reduction (from n to n−nδ) is due to the fact that we have to handle issues related to fixed points
of the tampering functions, and we ignore it for the proof sketch here.
The idea now is to use the framework of advice generators and correlation breakers with advice
to construct the non-malleable extractor [Coh15,CGL16]. We informally define these objects below
as we describe our explicit constructions.
We start with the construction of the advice generator advGen : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}a. Informally,
advGen is a weaker object than a non-malleable extractor, and we only need that advGen((X,
Y)π) 6= advGen((f1(X) + g1(Y), f2(X) + g2(Y))π) (with high probability). Further, it is crucial
that a≪ n, and in particular think of a = nγ for a small constant γ > 0. Without loss of generality,
suppose that ∀x ∈ support(X) and y ∈ support(Y), f1(x) + g1(y) 6= x.
Let Z = (X,Y)π. Let n0 = n
δ′ for some small constant δ′ > 0. We take two slices from Z, say
Z1 and Z2 of lengths n1 = n
c0
0 and n2 = 10n0, for some constant c0 > 1. Next, we use a good linear
error correcting code (let the encoder of this code be E) to encode Z and sample nγ coordinates (let
S denote this set) from this encoding using Z1 (the sampler is based on seeded extractors [Zuc97]).
Let W1 = E(Z)S. Next, using Z2, we sample a random set of indices T ⊂ [2n], and let Z3 = ZT.
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We now use an extractor for interleaved sources, i.e., an extractor that takes as input an unknown
interleaving of two independent sources and outputs uniform bits (see Section 1.3). Let iℓExt be
this extractor (say from Theorem 9), and we apply it to Z3 to get R = iℓExt(Z3). Finally, let W2
be the output of a linear seeded extractor1 LExt on Z with R as the seed. The output of the advice
generator is Z1 ◦ Z2 ◦ Z3 ◦W1 ◦W2.
The intuition that this works is as follows. We use the notation that if W = h((X,Y)π) (for
some function h), then W′ or (W)′ stands for the corresponding random variable after tampering,
i.e., h(((f1(X) + g1(Y)), (f2(X) + g2(Y)))π). Further, let Xi be the bits of X in Zi for i = 1, 2, 3
and X4 be the remaining bits of X. Similarly define Yi’s, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Without loss of generality
suppose that |X1| ≥ |Y1|, (where |α| denotes the length of the string α).
The correctness of advGen is direct if Zi 6= Z′i for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Thus, assume Zi = Z′i for
i = 1, 2, 3. It follows that hence S = S′,T = T′ and R = R′. Recall that (X,Y)π = X +Y and
h((f(X), g(Y))π) = f(X) + g(Y). Since E is a linear code and LExt is a linear seeded extractor,
the following hold:
W1 −W′1 = (E(X+Y − f(X)− g(Y)))S,
W2 −W′2 = LExt(X+Y − f(X)− g(Y),R).
Now the idea is the following: Either (i) we can fix X−f(X) and claim that X1 still has enough
min-entropy, or (ii) we can claim that X− f(X) has enough min-entropy conditioned on the fixing
of (X2,X3). Let us first discuss why this is enough. Suppose we are in the first case. Then, we can
fixX−f(X) andY and argue that Z1 is a deterministic function ofX and contains enough entropy.
Note that X+Y− f(X)− g(Y) is now fixed, and in fact it is fixed to a non-zero string (using the
assumption that f1(x) + g1(y) 6= x). Thus, E(X +Y − f(X) − g(Y)) is a string with a constant
fraction of the coordinates set to 1 (since E is an encoder of a linear error correcting code with
constant relative distance), and it follows that with high probability (E(X+Y − f(X)− g(Y)))S
contains a non-zero entry (using the fact that S is sampled using Z1, which has enough entropy).
This finishes the proof in this case since it implies W1 6=W′1 with high probability.
Now suppose we are in case (ii). We use the fact that Z2 contains entropy to conclude that
the sampled bits Z3 contain almost equal number of bits from X and Y (with high probability
over Z2). Now we can fix Z2 without loosing too much entropy from Z3 (by making the size of
Z3 to be significantly larger than Z2). Next, we observe that Z3 is an interleaved source, and
hence R is close to uniform. We now fix X3, and argue that R continues to be uniform. This
follows roughly from the fact that any 2-source extractor is strong [Rao07], which easily extends
to extractors for 2 interleaved sources. Thus, R now becomes a deterministic function of Y while
at the same time, X − f(X) still has enough min-entropy. Hence, LExt(X − f(X),R) is close to
uniform even conditioned on R. We can now fix R and LExt(Y − g(Y),R) without affecting the
distribution LExt(X − f(X),R), since LExt(Y − g(Y),R) is a deterministic function of Y while
LExt(X − f(X),R) is a deterministic function of X conditioned on the previous fixing of R. It
follows that after these fixings, W2 −W′2 is close to a uniform string and hence W2 −W′2 6= 0
with probability 1− 2−nΩ(1) , which completes the proof.
The fact that we can only consider case (i) and case (ii) relies on a careful convex combination
argument, which is in turn based on the pre-image size of the function τ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}2n defined
as τ(x) = (x, 0n)π − h((f(x), 0n)π) = x − f(x). The intuition is as follows. If conditioned on the
1A linear seeded extractor is a seeded extractor where for any fixing of the seed, the output is a linear function of
the source.
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fixing of τ(X) = X − f(X) we have that X still has very high min-entropy, then we can take the
slice Z1 such that X1 still has enough entropy conditioned on the fixing of τ(X). On the other
hand, if conditioned on the fixing of τ(X) we have that X does not have high min-entropy, then
τ(X) itself must have a large support size (or relatively high entropy). Therefore we can take the
slice Z2 and sample a short string Z3 such that conditioned on the fixing of (X2,X3), τ(X) still
has enough min-entropy. To make the whole argument work, we need to carefully choose the sizes
of the three slices Z1,Z2,Z3. In particular, we need to ensure that the size of (Z2,Z3) is much
smaller than that of Z1.
We now discuss the other crucial component in the construction, the advice correlation breaker
ACB : {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}a → {0, 1}m. Informally, ACB takes 2 inputs, a source Z (that contains
some min-entropy) and an advice string s ∈ {0, 1}a, and outputs a distribution on {0, 1}m with the
following guarantee. If Z′ is the distribution of Z after tampering, and s′ ∈ {0, 1}a is another advice
such that s 6= s′, then ACB(Z, s),ACB(Z′, s′) ≈ Um,ACB(Z′, s′). Typically, we also assume some
structures in Z (e.g., it consists of two independent sources or an interleaving of two independent
sources). Our main result is an advice correlation breaker that satisfies
ACB(X+Y, s),ACB(f(X) + g(Y), s′) ≈ǫ Um,ACB(f(X) + g(Y), s′),
for any fixed strings s, s′ ∈ {0, 1}a where s 6= s′. We note that correlation breakers have found
important applications in explicit constructions of seedless extractors [Coh15,Li16, Li18], thus we
believe the above correlation breaker can be of independent interest and potentially find other
applications. By composing the advice generator advGen and the correlation breaker ACB in the
natural way, we get the non-malleable extractor. Here we only briefly mention that the above advice
correlation breaker crucially exploits the “sum-structure” of the source and the tampering function,
the fact that extractors are samplers [Zuc97], and previous constructions of correlation breakers
using linear seeded extractors [CL17]. We refer the reader to Section 4.2 for more details.
Finally, it is far from obvious how to efficiently invert the extractor, or in other words, sample
from the pre-image of this non-malleable extractor. This is important since the encoder of the
corresponding non-malleable code is doing exactly the sampling and thus we need it to be efficient.
We use Section 6 to suitably modify our extractor to support efficient sampling. Here we briefly
sketch some high level ideas involved. Recall Z = (X ◦Y)π. The first modification is that in all
applications of seeded extractors in our construction, we specifically use linear seeded extractors.
This allows us to argue that the pre-image we are trying to sample from is in fact a convex
combination of distributions supported on subspaces. The next crucial observation is the fact that
we can use smaller disjoint slices of Z to carry out various steps outlined in the construction. This
is to ensure that the dimensions of the subspaces that we need to sample from, do not depend on
the values of random variables that we fix. For the steps where we use the entire source Z (in the
construction of the advice correlation breaker), we replace Z by a large enough slice of Z. However
this is problematic if we choose the slice deterministically, since in an arbitrary interleaving of two
sources, a slice of length less than n might have bits only from one source. We get around this by
pseudorandomly sampling enough coordinates from Z (by first taking a small slice of Z and using
a sampler that works for weak sources [Zuc97]).
We now use an elegant trick introduced by Li [Li17] where the output of the non-malleable
extractor described above (with the modifications that we have specified) is now used as a seed to
a linear seeded extractor applied on an even larger pseudorandom slice of Z. The linear seeded
extractor that we use has the property that for any fixing of the seed, the rank of the linear map
corresponding to the extractor is the same, and furthermore one can efficiently sample from the
pre-image of any output of the extractor. The final modification needed is a careful choice of the
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error correcting code used in the advice generator. For this we use a dual BCH code, which allows
us to argue that we can discard some output bits of the advice generator without affecting its
correctness (based on the dual distance of the code). This is crucial in order to argue that the rank
of the linear restriction imposed on the free variables of Z does not depend on the values of the
bits fixed so far. We refer the reader to Section 6 for more details.
Non-malleable extractors for (2, t)−CSS. We show that any 2-source non-malleable extractor
that works for min-entropy n − 2δn can be used as non-malleable extractor with respect to (2,
t) − CSS for t ≤ δn. The tampering function h that is based on the communication protocol can
be rephrased in terms of functions in the following way. Suppose the protocol lasts for ℓ rounds,
there exist deterministic functions fi and gi for i = 1, . . . , ℓ, and f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}2t → {0, 1}n
and g : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}2t → {0, 1}n such that the communication protocol between Alice and Bob
corresponds to computing the following random variables: S1 = f1(X),R1 = g1(Y,S1),S2 = f2(X,
S1,R1), . . . ,Si = fi(X,S1, . . . ,Si−1,R1, . . . ,Ri−1),Ri = gi(Y,S1, . . . ,Si,Ri,, . . . ,Ri−1), . . . ,Rℓ =
gℓ(Y,S1, . . . ,Sℓ,R1, . . . ,Rℓ−1).
Finally, X′ = f(X,R1, . . . ,Rℓ,S1, . . . ,Sℓ) and Y′ = g(Y,R1, . . . ,Rℓ,S1, . . . ,Sℓ) correspond to
the output of Alice and the output of Bob respectively. Thus, h(X,Y) = (X′,Y′).
Similar to the way we argue about alternating extraction protocols, we fix random variables in
the following order: Fix S1, and it follows that R1 is now a deterministic function of Y. We fix
R1, and thus S2 is now a deterministic function of X. Thus, continuing in this way, we can fix all
the random variables S1, . . . ,Sℓ and R1, . . . ,Rℓ while maintaining that X and Y are independent.
Further, invoking Lemma 3.1, with probability at least 1−2−Ω(n), both X and Y have min-entropy
at least n− t− δn ≥ n− 2δn since both parties send at most t bits.
Note that now, X′ is a deterministic function of X and Y′ is a deterministic function of Y .
Thus, any invertible 2-source non-malleable extractor for min-entropy n − 2δn can be used. Our
result follows by using such a construction from a recent work of Li [Li18].
Extractors for interleaved sources. We construct an explicit extractor iℓExt : {0, 1}2n →
{0, 1}m, m = Ω(n) that satisfies the following: Let X and Y be independent (n, k)-sources with
k ≥ (2/3 + δ)n, for any constant δ > 0. Let π : [2n]→ [2n] be any permutation. Then,
|iℓExt((X ◦Y)π)−Um| ≤ ǫ.
We present our construction and also explain the proof along the way, as this gives more intuition
to the different steps of the construction. Let Z = (X ◦Y)π. We start by taking a large enough
slice Z1 from Z (say, of length (2/3+ δ/2)n). Let X have more bits in this slice than Y. Let X1 be
the bits of X in Z1 and X2 be the remaining bits of X. Similarly define Y1 and Y2. Notice that
X1 has linear entropy and also that X2 has linear entropy conditioned on X1. We fix Y1 and use
a condenser (from works of Barak et al. [BRSW12] and Zuckerman [Zuc07]) to condense Z1 into
a matrix with a constant number such that at least one of the row has entropy rate at least 0.9.
Notice that this matrix is a deterministic function of X. The next step is to use Z and each row of
the matrix as a seed to a linear seeded extractor get longer rows. This requires some care for the
choice of the linear seeded extractor since the seed has some deficiency in entropy. After this step,
we use the advice correlation breaker from [CL16] on Z and each row of the somewhere random
source with the row number as the advice (similar to as done before in the construction of seedless
non-malleable extractors for 2ISS), and compute the bit-wise XOR of the different outputs that we
produce. Let V denote this random variable. Finally, to output Ω(n) bits we use a linear seeded
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extractor on Z with V as the seed. The correctness of various steps in the proof exploit the fact
that Z can be written as the bit-wise sum of two independent sources, and the fact that we use
linear seeded extractors. We refer the reader to Section 7 for more details.
3 Background and notation
We use Um to denote the uniform distribution on {0, 1}m.
For any integer t > 0, [t] denotes the set {1, . . . , t}.
For a string y of length n, and any subset S ⊆ [n], we use yS to denote the projection of y to the
coordinates indexed by S.
We use bold capital letters for random variables and samples as the corresponding small letter,
e.g., X is a random variable, with x being a sample of X.
For strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, we use x+ y (or equivalently x− y) to denote the bit-wise xor of the two
strings.
3.1 A probability lemma
The following result on min-entropy was proved by Maurer and Wolf [MW97].
Lemma 3.1. Let X,Y be random variables such that the random variable Y takes at ℓ values.
Then
Pry∼Y[H∞(X|Y = y) ≥ H∞(X)− log ℓ− log(1/ǫ)] > 1− ǫ.
3.2 Conditional min-entropy
Definition 3.2. The average conditional min-entropy of a source X given a random variable W
is defined as
H˜∞(X|W) = − log
(
Ew∼W
[
max
x
Pr[X = x|W = w]
])
= − log
(
E
[
2−H∞(X|W=w)
])
.
We recall some results on conditional min-entropy from the work of Dodis et al. [DORS08].
Lemma 3.3 ([DORS08]). For any ǫ > 0,
Prw∼W
[
H∞(X|W = w) ≥ H˜∞(X|W) − log(1/ǫ)
]
≥ 1− ǫ.
Lemma 3.4 ([DORS08]). If a random variable Y has support of size 2ℓ, then H˜∞(X|Y) ≥
H∞(X)− ℓ.
Definition 3.5. A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, ǫ)-seeded extractor if for
any source X of min-entropy k, |Ext(X,Ud)−Um| ≤ ǫ. Ext is called a strong seeded extractor if
|(Ext(X,Ud),Ud)− (Um,Ud)| ≤ ǫ, where Um and Ud are independent.
Further, if for each s ∈ Ud, Ext(·, s) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a linear function, then Ext is called
a linear seeded extractor.
We require extractors that can extract uniform bits when the source only has sufficient condi-
tional min-entropy.
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Definition 3.6. A (k, ǫ)-seeded average case seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
for min-entropy k and error ǫ satisfies the following property: For any source X and any arbitrary
random variable Z with H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ k,
Ext(X,Ud),Z ≈ǫ Um,Z.
It was shown in [DORS08] that any seeded extractor is also an average case extractor.
Lemma 3.7 ([DORS08]). For any δ > 0, if Ext is a (k, ǫ)-seeded extractor, then it is also a
(k + log(1/δ), ǫ + δ)-seeded average case extractor.
3.3 Samplers and extractors
Zuckerman [Zuc97] showed that seeded extractors can be used as samplers given access to weak
sources. This connection is best presented by a graph theoretic representation of seeded extractors.
A seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m can be viewed as an unbalanced bipartite
graph GExt with 2
n left vertices (each of degree 2d) and 2m right vertices. Let N (x) denote the set
of neighbors of x in GExt.
Theorem 3.8 ([Zuc97]). Let Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a seeded extractor for min-entropy
k and error ǫ. Let D = 2d. Then for any set R ⊆ {0, 1}m,
|{x ∈ {0, 1}n : ||N (x) ∩R| − µRD| > ǫD}| < 2k,
where µR = |R|/2m.
Theorem 3.9 ([Zuc97]). Let Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a seeded extractor for min-entropy
k and error ǫ. Let {0, 1}d = {r1, . . . , rD}, D = 2d. Define Samp(x) = {Ext(x, r1), . . . ,Ext(x, rD)}.
Let X be an (n, 2k)-source. Then for any set R ⊆ {0, 1}m,
Prx∼X[||Samp(x) ∩R| − µRD| > ǫD] < 2−k,
where µR = |R|/2m.
3.4 Explicit extractors from prior work
We recall an optimal construction of strong-seeded extractors.
Theorem 3.10 ([GUV09]). For any constant α > 0, and all integers n, k > 0 there exists a
polynomial time computable strong-seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d =
O(log n+ log(1/ǫ)) and m = (1− α)k.
The following are explicit constructions of linear seeded extractors.
Theorem 3.11 ([Tre01,RRV02]). For every n, k,m ∈ N and ǫ > 0, with m ≤ k ≤ n, there exists
an explicit strong linear seeded extractor LExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m for min-entropy k and
error ǫ, where d = O
(
log2(n/ǫ)/ log(k/m)
)
.
A drawback of the above construction is that the seeded length is ω(log n) for sub-linear min-
entropy. A construction of Li [Li15] achieves O(log n) seed length for even polylogarithmic min-
entropy.
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Theorem 3.12 ([Li15]). There exists a constant c > 1 such that for every n, k ∈ N with c log8 n ≤
k ≤ n and any ǫ ≥ 1/n2, there exists a polynomial time computable linear seeded extractor LExt : {0,
1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m for min-entropy k and error ǫ, where d = O(log n) and m ≤ √k.
A different construction achieves seed length O(log(n/ǫ)) for high entropy sources.
Theorem 3.13 ([CGL16, Li17]). For all δ > 0 there exist α, γ > 0 such that for all integers
n > 0, ǫ ≥ 2−γn, there exists an efficiently computable linear strong seeded extractor LExt :
{0, 1}n ×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}αd, d = O(log(n/ǫ)) for min-entropy δn. Further, for any y ∈ {0, 1}d, the
linear map LExt(·, y) has rank αd.
The above theorem is stated in [Li17] for δ = 0.9, but it is straightforward to see that the proof
extends for any constant δ > 0.
We use a property of linear seeded extractors proved by Rao [Rao09].
Lemma 3.14 ([Rao09]). Let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a linear seeded extractor for
min-entropy k with error ǫ < 12 . Let X be an affine (n, k)-source. Then
Pr
u∼Ud
[|Ext(X,u)− Um| > 0] ≤ 2ǫ.
We recall a two-source extractor construction for high entropy sources based on the inner
product function.
Theorem 3.15 ([CG88] ). For all m, r > 0, with q = 2m, n = rm, let X,Y be independent sources
on Frq with min-entropy k1, k2 respectively. Let IP be the inner product function over the field Fq.
Then, we have:
|IP(X,Y),X−Um,X| ≤ ǫ, |IP(X,Y),Y −Um,Y| ≤ ǫ
where ǫ = 2−(k1+k2−n−m)/2.
3.5 Advice correlation breakers
We use a primitive called ‘correlation breaker’ in our construction. Consider a situation where
we have arbitrarily correlated random variables Y1, . . . ,Yr, where each Yi is on ℓ bits. Further
suppose Y1 is a ‘good’ random variable (typically, we assume Y1 is uniform or has almost full min-
entropy). A correlation breaker CB is an explicit function that takes some additional resource X,
where X is typically additional randomness (an (n, k)-source) that is independent of {Y1, . . . ,Yr}.
Thus using X, the task is to break the correlation between Y1 and the random variables Y2, . . . ,
Yr, i.e., CB(Y1,X) is independent of {CB(Y2,X), . . . ,CB(Yr,X)}. A weaker notion is that of an
advice correlation breaker that takes in some advice for each of the Yi’s as an additional resource
in breaking the correlations. This primitive was implicitly constructed in [CGL16] and used in
explicit constructions of non-malleable extractors, and has subsequently found many applications
in explicit constructions of extractors for independent sources and non-malleable extractors.
We recall an explicit advice correlation breaker constructed in [CL16]. This correlation breaker
works even with the weaker guarantee that the ‘helper source’ X is now allowed to be correlated
to the sources random variables Y1, . . . ,Yr in a structured way. Concretely, we assume the source
to be of the form X + Z, where X is assumed to be an (n, k)-source that is uncorrelated with
Y1, . . . ,Yr,Z. We now state the result more precisely.
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Theorem 3.16 ([CL16]). For all integers n, n1, n2, k, k1, k2, t, d, h, λ and any ǫ > 0, such that
d = O(log2(n/ǫ)), k1 ≥ 2d + 8tdh + log(1/ǫ), n1 ≥ 2d + 10tdh + (4ht + 1)n22 + log(1/ǫ), and
n2 ≥ 2d+ 3td+ log(1/ǫ), let
• X be an (n, k1)-source, X′ a r.v on n bits, Y1 be an (n1, n1 − λ)-source, Z,Z′ are r.v’s on n
bits, and Y2, . . . ,Yt be r.v’s on n1 bits each, such that {X,X′} is independent of {Z,Z′,Y1,
. . . ,Yt},
• id1, . . . , idt be bit-strings of length h such that for each i ∈ {2, t}, id1 6= idi.
Then there exists an efficient algorithm ACB : {0, 1}n1×{0, 1}n×{0, 1}h → {0, 1}n2 which satisfies
the following: let
• Y1h = ACB(Y1,X+ Z, id1),
• Yih = ACB(Yi,X′ + Z′, idi), i ∈ [2, t]
Then,
Y1h,Y
2
h, . . . ,Y
t
h,X,X
′ ≈O((h+2λ)ǫ) Un2 ,Y2h, . . . ,Yth,X,X′.
4 NM extractors for linear composed with interleaved split-state
adversaries
The main result of this section is an explicit non-malleable extractor against the tampering family
Lin ◦ 2ISS ⊂ F2n.
Theorem 4.1. For all integers n > 0 there exists an explicit function nmExt : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}m,
m = nΩ(1), such that the following holds: For any linear function h : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}2n, arbitrary
tampering functions f, g ∈ Fn, any permutation π : [2n] → [2n] and independent uniform sources
X and Y each on n bits, there exists a distribution Dh,f,g,π on {0, 1}m ∪ {same⋆}, such that
|nmExt((X ◦Y)π),nmExt(h((f(X) ◦ g(Y))π))−Um, copy(Dh,f,g,π,Um)| ≤ 2−nΩ(1) .
Our first step is to show that in order to prove Theorem 4.1 it is enough to construct a non-
malleable extractor satisfying Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.2. There exists a δ > 0 such that for all integers n, k > 0 with n ≥ k ≥ n− nδ, there
exists an explicit function nmExt : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}m, m = nΩ(1), such that the following holds:
Let X and Y be independent (n, n − nδ)-sources, π : [2n] → [2n] any arbitrary permutation and
arbitrary tampering functions f1, f2, g1, g2 ∈ Fn that satisfy the following condition:
• ∀x ∈ support(X) and y ∈ support(Y), f1(x) + g1(y) 6= x or
• ∀x ∈ support(X) and y ∈ support(Y), f2(x) + g2(y) 6= y.
Then,
|nmExt((X ◦Y)π),nmExt(((f1(X) + g1(Y)) ◦ (f2(X) + g2(Y)))π)−
Um,nmExt(((f1(X) + g1(Y)) ◦ (f2(X) + g2(Y)))π)| ≤ 2−nΩ(1) .
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Proof of Theorem 4.1 assuming Theorem 4.2. Define f(x) = h((f(x)◦0n)π) and g(y) = h((0n◦y)π).
Thus, h((f(x) ◦ g(y))π) = f(x) + g(y). Define functions h1 : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n and h2 : {0, 1}2n →
{0, 1}n such that h((f(x) ◦ g(y))π) = (h1(x, y) ◦ h2(x, y))π. Since h(f(x), g(y)) = f(x) + g(y), it
follows that there exists functions f1, g1, f2, g2 ∈ Fn such that for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, the following
hold:
• h1(x, y) = f1(x) + g1(y), and
• h2(x, y) = f2(x) + g2(y).
Thus, h((f(x) ◦ g(y))π) = ((f1(x) + g1(y)) ◦ (f2(x) + g2(y)))π .
Now, the idea is to show that ((X ◦ Y)π, ((f1(X) + g1(Y)) ◦ (f2(X) + g2(Y)))π) is 2−nΩ(1) -
close to a convex combination of ((X ◦Y)π, (X ◦Y)π) and distributions of the form ((X′ ◦Y′)π,
((η1(X) + ν1(Y)) ◦ (η2(X) + ν2(Y)))π), where X′ and Y′ are independent (n, n − nδ)-sources and
η1, η2, ν1, ν2 are deterministic functions in Fn satisfying the conditions that:
• ∀x ∈ support(X′) and y ∈ support(Y′), η1(x) + ν1(y) 6= x or
• ∀x ∈ support(X′) and y ∈ support(Y′), η2(x) + ν2(y) 6= y.
Theorem 4.1 is then direct from from Theorem 4.2.
Let n0 = n
δ. For any y ∈ {0, 1}n and any function η : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, let η−1(y) denote the
set {z ∈ {0, 1}n : η(z) = y}. We partition {0, 1}n into the following two sets:
Γ1 = {y ∈ {0, 1}n : |g−11 (g1(y))| ≥ 2n−n0}, Γ2 = {0, 1}n \ Γ1.
Let Y1 be uniform on Γ1 and Y2 be uniform on Γ2. Clearly, Y is a convex combination of Y1 and
Y2 with weights wi = |Γ1|/2n, i = 1, 2. If wi ≤ 2−n0/2, we ignore the corresponding source and
add an error of 2−n0/2 to the extractor. Thus, suppose wi ≥ 2−n0/2 for i = 1, 2. Thus, Y1 and Y2
each have min-entropy at least n− n0/2.
We claim that g1(Y2) has min-entropy at least n0/2. This can be seen in the following way.
For any y ∈ Γ2, |g−11 (g1(y))| ≤ 2n−n0 , and hence it follows g1(Y2) has min-entropy at least (n −
n0/2) − (n − n0) = n0/2. Thus, clearly for any x ∈ {0, 1}n, x + g1(Y2) 6= x with probability at
least 1− 2−n0/2. We add a term of 2−nΩ(1) to the error and assume that X + g1(Y2) 6= X. Thus,
(X ◦Y2)π, ((f1(X) + g1(Y2)) ◦ (f1(X) + g1(Y2)))π is indeed 2−nΩ(1)close to a convex combination
of distributions of the required form.
Next, we claim that for any fixing of g1(Y1), the random variable Y1 has min-entropy at least
n− n0. This is direct from the fact that for any y ∈ Γ2, |g−11 (g1(y))| > 2n−n0 . We fix g1(Y1) = g,
and let f1,g(x) = f1(x) + g. Thus, f1,g(X) = f1(X) + g1(Y1). We now partition {0, 1}n according
to the fixed points of f1,g. Let
∆1 = {x : f ′1(x) = x}, ∆2 = {0, 1}n \∆1.
Let X1 be a flat distribution on ∆1 and X2 be a flat distribution on ∆2. If |∆1| < 2n−n0/2,
we ignore the distribution X1 and add an error of 2
n−n0/2 to the analyis of the non-malleable
extractor. Further, it is direct from definition that f1(X2) + g 6= X2. We now handle to case when
∆1 > 2
n−n0/2. Note that in this case, H1(X1) ≥ n − n0/2. The idea is now to partition ∆1 into
two sets based on the pre-image size of f2 similar to the way we partioned the support of Y based
on the pre-image size of g1. Define the sets
∆11 = {x ∈ ∆1 : |f−12 (f2(x)) ∩∆1| ≥ 2n−n0}, ∆12 = ∆1 \∆11.
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Let X11 be flat on ∆11 and X12 be flat on ∆12. Clearly, X1 is a convex combination of
the sources X11 and X12. If ∆11 or ∆12 is smaller than 2
n−3n0/4, we ignore the corresponding
distribution and add an error of 2−n0/4 to the error analysis of the non-malleable extractor. Thus
suppose ∆1i ≥ 2n−3n0/4 for i = 1, 2. Thus, X11 and X12 both have min-entropy at least n− 3n0/4.
We claim that f2(X12) has min-entropy at least n0/4. This can be seen in the following way.
For any x ∈ ∆12, |f−12 (f2(x))∩∆1| ≤ 2n−n0 , and hence it follows f2(X12) has min-entropy at least
(n − 3n0/4) − (n − n0) = n0/4. Thus, clearly f2(X12) + g2(Y1) 6= Y1 with probability at least
1− 2−n0/4. As before, we add an error of 2−nΩ(1) to the error, and assume that f2(X12)+ g2(Y1) 6=
Y1. Thus, (X12 ◦ Y1)π, ((f1(X12) + g1(Y2)) ◦ (f1(X12) + g1(Y2)))π is indeed 2−nΩ(1)-close to a
convex combination of distributions of the required form.
Next, we claim that for any fixing of f2(X11), the random variable X11 has min-entropy at
least n − n0. This is direct from the fact that for any x ∈ ∆1, |f−12 (f1(x)) ∩∆1| > 2n−n0 . We fix
f2(X11) = λ, and let g2,λ(y) = λ + g2(y). Thus, g2,λ(Y) = f1(X) + g1(Y1). We now partition Γ1
according to the fixed points of f1,g. Let
Γ11 = {y : g2,λ(y) = y}, Γ12 = {0, 1}n \ Γ11.
Let Y11 be a flat distribution on Γ11 and Y12 be a flat distribution on Γ12. It follows from
definition that (f1(X11)+ g1(Y11), f2(X11)+ g2(Y11)) = (X11,Y11). Further, f2(X11)+ g2(Y12) 6=
Y12, and hence (X11 ◦ Y12)π, ((f1(X11) + g1(Y12)) ◦ (f1(X11) + g1(Y12)))π is 2−nΩ(1) -close to a
convex combination of distributions of the required form. This completes the proof.
In the rest of the section, we prove Theorem 4.2. We assume the setup given from Theorem 4.2.
Thus, X and Y are independent (n, n − nδ)-sources, π : [2n] → [2n] is an arbitrary permutation
and f1, f2, g1, g2 ∈ Fn satisfy the following conditions:
• ∀x ∈ support(X) and y ∈ support(Y), f1(x) + g1(y) 6= x or
• ∀x ∈ support(X) and y ∈ support(Y), f2(x) + g2(y) 6= y.
We use the following notation: if W = h((X ◦Y)π) (for some function h), then we use to W′
or (W)′ to denote the random variable h(((f1(X) + g1(Y)) ◦ (f2(X) + g2(Y)))π). Further, define
X = (X◦0n)π, Y = (0n◦Y)π, f1(X) = (f1(X)◦0n)π, f2(X) = (0n ◦f2(X))π, g1(Y) = (g1(Y)◦0n)π
and g2(Y) = (0
n ◦ g2(Y))π. It follows that Z = X+Y and Z′ = f1(X) + g1(Y) + f2(X) + g2(Y).
We use Section 4.1 to construct an advice generator and Section 4.2 to construct an advice
correlation breaker. Finally, we present the non-malleable extractor construction in Section 4.3.
4.1 An advice generator
Lemma 4.3. There exists an efficiently computable function advGen : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n4 ,
n4 = n
δ, such that with probability at least 1 − 2−nΩ(1) over the fixing of the random variables
{advGen((X ◦Y)π), advGen(((f1(X) + g1(Y)) ◦ (f2(X) + g2(Y)))π)}, the following hold:
• {advGen((X ◦Y)π) 6= advGen(((f1(X) + g1(Y)) ◦ (f2(X) + g2(Y)))π)},
• X and Y are independent,
• H∞(X) ≥ k − 2nδ, H∞(Y) ≥ k − 2nδ.
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We prove the above lemma in the rest of this subsection. We claim that the function advGen
computed by Algorithm 1 satisfies the above lemma. We first set up some parameters and ingre-
dients.
• Let C be a large enough constant and δ′ = δ/C.
• Let n0 = nδ′ , n1 = nc00 , n2 = 10n0, for some constant c0 that we set below.
• Let E : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n3 be the encoding function of a linear error correcting code C with
constant rate α and constant distance β.
• Let Ext1 : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}log(n3) be a (n1/20, β/10)-seeded extractor instantiated
using Theorem 3.10. Thus d1 = c1 log n1, for some constant c1. Let D1 = 2
d1 = nc11 .
• Let Samp1 : {0, 1}n1 → [n3]D1 be the sampler obtained from Theorem 3.9 using Ext1.
• Let Ext2 : {0, 1}n2 × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}log(2n) be a (n2/20, 1/n0)-seeded extractor instantiated
using Theorem 3.10. Thus d2 = c2 log n2, for some constant c2. Let D2 = 2
d
2. Thus D2 =
2d2 = nc22 .
• Let Samp2 : {0, 1}n2 → [2n]D2 be the sampler obtained from Theorem 3.9 using Ext2.
• Set c0 = 2c2.
• Let iℓExt : {0, 1}D2 → {0, 1}n0 be the extractor from Theorem 7.1.
• Let LExt : {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}n0 → {0, 1}n0 be a linear seeded extractor instantiated from
Theorem 3.15 set to extract from min-entropy n1/100 and error 2
−Ω(√n0) .
Algorithm 1: advGen(z)
Input: Bit-string z = (x ◦ y)π of length 2n, where x and y are each n bit-strings and
π : [2n]→ [2n] is a permutation.
Output: Bit string v of length n4.
1 Let z1 = Slice(z, n1), z2 = Slice(z, n2).
2 Let S = Samp1(z1).
3 Let T = Samp2(z2) and z3 = zT .
4 Let r = iℓExt(z3).
5 Let w1 = (E(z))S .
6 Let w2 = LExt(z, r).
7 Output v = z1 ◦ z2 ◦ z3 ◦ w1 ◦ w2.
Lemma 4.4. With probability at least 1− 2−nΩ(1) , V 6= V′.
Proof. We prove the lemma assuming f1(X) + g1(Y) 6= X. The proof in the other case (i.e.,
f2(X) + g2(Y) 6= Y) is similar and we skip it.
First observe that the lemma is direct if Z1 6= Z′1 or Z2 6= Z′2 or Z3 6= Z′3. Thus, we can assume
Zi = Z
′
i for i = 1, 2, 3. It is easy to see that S = S
′,T = T′, and Z4 = Z′4.
Now observe that
Z− Z′ = X+Y − f1(X)− g1(Y)− f2(X)− g2(Y).
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Note that Z− Z′ 6= 0 which follows from our assumption that f1(X) + g1(Y) 6= X.
Now define the function h1 : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}2n as h1(z) = z−f1(z)−f2(z) and h2 : {0, 1}2n →
{0, 1}2n as h2(z) = z − g1(z)− g2(z).
Thus,
Z− Z′ = h1(X) + h2(Y).
Let Xi be the bits of X in Zi for i = 1, 2, 3 and X4 be the remaining bit of X. Similarly define
Yi’s, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Without loss of generality suppose that |X1| ≥ |Y1|, (where |α| denotes the
length of the string α).
Let Γ ⊂ {0, 1}2n denote the support of the source X. We partition Γ into two sets Γa and Γb
according to the pre-image size of the function h1 in the following way. For any z ∈ {0, 1}2n, let
h−11 (z) denote the set {y ∈ {0, 1}2n : h1(y) = z}.
Let np = n1/50. Define
Γa = {z ∈ Γ : |h−11 (h1(z)) ∩ Γ| ≥ 2n−np}, Γb = Γ \ Γ1.
Let pa = Pr[X ∈ Γa] and pb = Pr[X ∈ Γb]. Let Xa be the source supported on Γa with the
probability law Pr[Xa = z] =
1
pa
· Pr[X = z]. Also define Xb supported on Γb with the probability
law Pr[Xa = z] =
1
pb
· Pr[X = z].
Clearly X is a convex combination of the distributions Xa and Xb, with weights pa and pb
respectively. If any of pa or pb is less that 2
−n0 , we ignore the corresponding source and add it to
the error. Thus suppose both pa and pb are at least 2
−n0 . This implies that both Xa and Xb have
min-entropy at least n− 2n0. We record the following two bounds that are direct from the above
definitions.
• For any fixing of h1(Xa) = xa, Xa has min-entropy at least n− np.
• The distribution h1(Xb) has min-entropy at least np − 2n0.
We introduce some notation. For any random variable ν = η(X,Y) (where η is an arbitrary
deterministic function), we add an extra a or b to the subscript and use νa to denote the random
variable η(Xa,Y) and νb to denote the random variables η(Xb,Y) respectively. For example,
Z′1,a = f1(Xa) + g1(Y) + f2(Xa) + g2(Y). Further we use Xa to denote the distribution on n bits
such that Xa = (Xa ◦ 0n)π. We similarly define the distribution Xb.
We prove the following two statements:
1. W1,a −W′1,a 6= 0 with probability 1− 2−n
Ω(1)
.
2. W2,b −W′2,b 6= 0 with probability 1− 2−n
Ω(1)
.
It is direct that the lemma follows from the above two inequalities.
We begin with the proof of (1). Since E is a linear code, we have
W1,a −W′1,a = (E(Za − Z′a))Sa .
= (E(h1(Xa) + h2(Y)))Sa .
Now fix the random h1(Xa), and it follows that Xa has min-entropy at least n−np. Recall that we
assumed |X1| ≥ |Y1|. Thus, X1,a has min-entropy at least n1/2−np−n0 > n1/10 with probability
19
at least 1 − 2−n0 . Further fix Y, and note that this does not affect the distribution of X1,a. This
fixes E(Za−Z′a). Further Za 6= Z′a, the E(Za−Z′a) contains 1’s at least β fraction of its coordinates.
Recalling that Sa = Samp1(Z1,a), it now follows from Theorem 3.9 that with probability at least
1− 2−nΩ(1) , (E(Za − Z′a))S is a non-zero string (and hence W1,a −W′1,a 6= 0). This completes the
proof of this case.
We now proceed to prove (2). Using the fact that LExt is a linear seeded extractor, it follows
that
W2,b −W′2,b = LExt(Zb − Z′b,Rb)
= LExt(h1(Xb),Rb) + LExt(h2(Yb),Rb).
Without loss of generality, suppose X has more bits in Z2 (the argument is identical in the other
case). Since X2,b has min-entropy at least n − 2n0, it follows that X2,b has min-entropy at least
n2
2 − 3n0 > n210 with probability at least 1 − 2−n0 . Fix the bits of Y in Z2, and thus Z2,b is a
deterministic function of X2,b. Recall that Tb = Samp2(Z2). It is now straightforward to see that
with probability 1−2−nΩ(1) over the fixing ofX2,b, |Tb|·(1/2−o(1)) ≤ |Tb∩π([n])| ≤ |Tb|·(1/2+o(1).
Recall |Tb| = D2. We fix X2,b such that (1/2− o(1))D2 ≤ |Tb ∩π([n])| ≤ (1/2 + o(1))D2. Thus, Z3
contains at least (1/2 − o(1))D2 bits from both Xb and Y. It follows that both X3,b and Y both
have min-entropy at least (1/2− o(1))D2 − 2n0−n2 = (1/2− o(1))D2 (even with the conditionings
so far), and hence Rb is 2
−nΩ(1)-close to uniform. We argue this this hold even conditioned on
X3,b. This follows roughly from the fact that any 2-source extractor is strong [Rao07] which easily
extends to interleaved extractors. We fix X3,b, and thus Rb is now a deterministic function of Y.
Next, we note that h1(Xb) has min-entropy at least (n − 2n0) − (n − np) − n2 − D2 − n0 =
np − 3n0 −D2 − n2 > np/2 (with probability 1− 2−nΩ(1)). Thus, LExt(h1(Xb),Rb) is 2−nΩ(1)-close
to uniform. We fix Rb and LExt(h1(Xb),Rb) continues to be close to uniform using the fact that
LExt is a strong-seeded extractor. Further, LExt(h1(Xb),Rb) is now a deterministic function of
Xb and we can fix LExt(h2(Yb),Rb) which is a deterministic function of Y. It thus follows that
W2,b −W′2,b 6= 0 with probability 1 − 2−n
Ω(1)
using the fact that LExt(h1(Xb),Rb) is close to
uniform. This completes the proof of (2). The fact that V and V′ can be fixed such that X and
Y remain independent with min-entropy at least k − 2nδ (with probability 1 − 2−nΩ(1)) is easy to
verify from the construction. This completes the proof of Lemma 4.4.
4.2 An Advice Correlation Breaker
We recall the setup of Theorem 4.2. X and Y are independent (n, k)-sources, k ≥ n − nδ, π :
[2n]→ [2n] is an arbitrary permutation and f1, f2, g1, g2 ∈ Fn satisfy the following conditions:
• ∀x ∈ support(X) and y ∈ support(Y), f1(x) + g1(y) 6= x or
• ∀x ∈ support(X) and y ∈ support(Y), f2(x) + g2(y) 6= y.
Further, we defined the following: X = (X ◦ 0n)π, Y = (0n ◦ Y)π, f1(X) = (f1(X) ◦ 0n)π,
f2(X) = (0
n◦f2(X))π , g1(Y) = (g1(Y)◦0n)π and g2(Y) = (0n◦g2(Y))π. It follows that Z = X+Y
and Z′ = f1(X) + g1(Y) + f2(X) + g2(Y). Thus, for some functions f, g ∈ F2n, Z′ = f(X) + g(Y).
Let X′ = f(X) and Y′ = g(Y).
The following is the main result of this section. Assume that we have some random variables
such that X and Y continue to be independent, and H∞(X),H∞(Y) ≥ k − 2nδ.
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Lemma 4.5. There exists an efficiently computable function ACB : {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}m,
n1 = n
δ and m = nΩ(1), such that
ACB(X+Y, w),ACB(f(X) + g(Y), w′) ≈ǫ Um,ACB(f(X) + g(Y), w′),
for any fixed strings w,w′ ∈ {0, 1}n1 with w 6= w′.
We use the rest of the section to prove the above lemma. In particular, we prove that the
function ACB computed by Algorithm 2 satisfies the conclusion of Lemma 4.5.
We start by setting up some ingredients and parameters.
• Let δ > 0 be a small enough constant.
• Let n2 = nδ1 , where δ1 = 2δ.
• Let LExt1 : {0, 1}n2 ×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}d1 , d1 = √n2, be a linear-seeded extractor instantiated
from Theorem 3.11 set to extract from entropy k1 = n2/10 with error ǫ1 = 1/10. Thus
d = C1 log n2, for some constant C1. Let D = 2
d = nδ2 , δ2 = 2C1δ.
• Set δ′ = 20C1δ.
• Let LExt2 : {0, 1}2n ×{0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}n4 , n4 = n8δ3 be a linear-seeded extractor instantiated
from Theorem 3.11 set to extract from entropy k2 = 0.9k with error ǫ2 = 2
−Ω(√d1) = 2−n
Ω(1)
,
such that the seed length of the extractor LExt2 (by Theorem 3.11) is d1.
• Let ACB′ : {0, 1}n1,acb′ × {0, 1}nacb′ × {0, 1}hacb′ → {0, 1}n2,acb′ , be the advice correlation
breaker from Theorem 3.16 set with the following parameters: nacb′ = 2n, n1,acb′ = n4,
n2,acb′ = m = O(n
2δ2), tacb′ = 2D,hacb′ = n1 + d, ǫacb′ = 2
−nδ , dacb′ = O(log2(n/ǫacb′)),
λacb′ = 0. It can be checked that by our choice of parameters, the conditions required for
Theorem 3.16 indeed hold for k1,acb′ ≥ n2δ2 .
Algorithm 2: ACB(z)
Input: Bit-strings z = (x ◦ y)π of length 2n and bit string w of length n1, where x and y are
each n bit-strings and π : [2n]→ [2n] is a permutation.
Output: Bit string of length m.
1 Let z1 = Slice(z, n2).
2 Let v be a D × n3 matrix, with its i’th row vi = LExt1(z1, i).
3 Let r be a D × n4 matrix, with its i’th row ri = LExt2(z, vi).
4 Let s be a D ×m matrix, with its i’th row si = ACB′(ri, z, w ◦ i).
5 Output ⊕Di=1si.
Let X1 be the bits of X in Z1 and X2 be the remaining bit of X. Define Y1 and Y2 similarly.
Without loss of generality suppose that |X1| ≥ |Y1|. Let X1 = Slice(X, n2) and Y1 = Slice(Y,
n2). Define X
′
1 = Slice(f(X), n2) and Y1
′
= Slice(g(Y), n2). It follows that Z1 = X1 +Y1 and
Z′1 = X
′
1 +Y
′
1.
Claim 4.6. Conditioned on the random variables Y1,Y
′
1, {LExt2(X,LExt1(X1 + Y1, i))}Di=1,
{LExt2(X′,LExt1(X′1 +Y′1, i))}i∈[D], X1 and X′1, the following hold:
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• the matrix R is 2−nΩ(1)-close to a somewhere random source,
• R and R′ are deterministic functions of Y,
• H∞(X) ≥ n− nδ′ , H∞(Y) ≥ n− nδ′ .
Proof. By construction, we have that for any j ∈ [D],
Rj = LExt2(Z,LExt1(Z1, j))
= LExt2(X+Y,LExt1(X1 +Y1, j))
= LExt2(X,LExt1(X1 +Y1, j)) + LExt2(Y,LExt1(X1 +Y1, j))
Similarly,
R′j = LExt2(X
′
,LExt1(X
′
1 +Y
′
1, j)) + LExt2(Y
′
,LExt1(X
′
1 +Y
′
1, j)).
Fix the random variables Y1,Y
′
1. Note that after these fixings, Y has min-entropy at least k −
2n1−n2 > 0.9k. Now, since LExt2 is a strong seeded extractor for entropy 0.9k, it follows that there
exists a set T ⊂ {0, 1}d1 , |T | ≥ (1−√ǫ2)2d1 , such that for any j ∈ [T ], |LExt2(Y, j)−Un4 | ≤
√
ǫ2.
Now viewing LExt1 as a sampler (see Section 3.3) using the weak source X1,y1 = X1 + y1, it
follows by Theorem 3.9 that
Pr[|{LExt1(X1,y1 , i) : i ∈ {0, 1}d} ∩ T | > (1−
√
ǫ2 − ǫ1)D] ≥ 1− 20.2n2 = 1− 2−nΩ(1) .
We fix X1, and it follows that with probability at least 1 − 2−nΩ(1) , {LExt1(X1,y1 , i) : i ∈
{0, 1}d}∩T 6= ∅, and thus there exists a j ∈ [D] such that LExt2(Y,LExt1(X1+Y1, j)) is 2−nΩ(1) -
close to Un2 and is a deterministic function of Y.
We now fix the random variablesX
′
1, {LExt2(X,LExt1(X1+Y1, i))}Di=1, {LExt2(X
′
,LExt1(X1
′
+
Y1
′
, i))}Di=1, and note that LExt2(Y,LExt1(X1 +Y1, j)) continues to be 2−n
Ω(1)
-close to Un2 . It
follows that Rj is 2
−nΩ(1)-close to Un2 . Further, for any i ∈ [D], the random variables Ri and R′i
are deterministic functions of Y. Finally, note that X and Y remain independent after these condi-
tionings, and H∞(X) ≥ n−3n1−2n2−2Dn4 ≥ n−n10δ2 and H∞(Y) ≥ n−3n1−n2 > n−nδ2 .
Lemma 4.5 is now direct from the next claim.
Claim 4.7. There exists j ∈ [D] such that
Sj, {Si}i∈[D]\j ≈2−nΩ(1) Um, {Si}i∈[D]\j.
Proof. Fix the random variables: W,W′,Y1,Y
′
1, {LExt2(X,LExt1(X1 +Y1, i))}Di=1, {LExt2(X
′
,
LExt1(X
′
1 + Y
′
1, i))}i∈[D], X1 and X′1. By Lemma 4.3, we have that with probability at least
1 − 2−nΩ(1) , W 6= W′. Further, by Claim 4.6 we have that R and R′ are deterministic functions
of Y, and with probability at least 1 − 2−nΩ(1) , there exists j ∈ [D] such that Rj is 2−nΩ(1)-close
to uniform, and H∞(X) ≥ 12nacb − nδ
′
> n2δ2 . Recall that Z = X +Y and Z′ = X′ +Y′. It now
follows by Theorem 3.16 that
ACB′(Rj ,Z,W ◦ j), {ACB′(Ri,X+Y,W ◦ i)}i∈[D]\j , {ACB′(R′i,X′ +Y′,W′ ◦ i)}i∈[D] ≈2−nΩ(1)
Um, {ACB′(Ri,X+Y,W ◦ i)}i∈[D]\j , {ACB′(R′i,X′ +Y′,W′ ◦ i)}i∈[D]
This completes the proof of the claim.
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4.3 The non-malleable extractor
We are now ready to present the construction of iℓNM that satisfies the requirements of Theorem 4.2.
• Let δ > 0 be a small enough constant, n1 = nδ and m = nΩ(1).
• Let advGen : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n1 , n1 = nδ, be the advice generator from Lemma 4.3.
• Let ACB : {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}m be the advice correlation breaker from Lemma 4.5.
Algorithm 3: iℓNM(z)
Input: Bit-string z = (x ◦ y)π of length 2n, where x and y are each n bit-strings, and
π : [2n]→ [2n] is a permutation.
Output: Bit string of length m.
1 Let w = advGen(z).
2 Output ACB(z, w)
We prove that the function iℓNM computed by Algorithm 3 satisfies the conclusion of Theorem 4.2
as follows. Fix the random variablesW,W′. By Lemma 4.3, it follows that X remains independent
of Y, and with probability at least 1 − 2−nΩ(1) , H∞(X) ≥ k − 2n1 and H∞(Y) ≥ k − 2n1 (recall
k ≥ n− nδ). Theorem 4.2 is now direct using Lemma 4.5.
5 Non-malleable extractors for split-state adversaries with bounded
communication
Let Fn,t ⊂ F2n be the set of all functions that can be computed in the following way. Let c = (x, y)
be the input in {0, 1}2n, where x is the first n bits of c and y is the remaining n bits of c. Let Alice
and Bob be two tampering adversaries, where Alice has access to x and Bob has access to y. Alice
and Bob run a (deterministic) communication protocol based on x and y respectively, which can
last for an arbitrary number of rounds but each party sends at most t bits. Finally, based on the
transcript and x Alice outputs x′ ∈ {0, 1}n, similarly based on the transcript and y Bob outputs
y′ ∈ {0, 1}n. The function outputs c′ = (x′, y′). The following is our main result.
Theorem 5.1. There exists a constant δ > 0 such that for all integers n, t > 0 with t ≤ δn, there
exists an efficiently computable function nmExt : {0, 1}n ×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, m = Ω(n), such that
the following holds: let X and Y be uniform independent sources each on n bits, and let h be an
arbitrary tampering function in Fn,t. Then, there exists a distribution Dh on {0, 1}m ∪ {same⋆}
that is independent of X and Y such that
|nmExt(X,Y),nmExt(h(X,Y)) −Um, copy(Dh,Um)| ≤ 2−Ω(n log logn/ logn).
Further, nmExt is 2−Ω(n log logn/ logn)-invertible.
Proof. We show that any 2-source non-malleable extractor that works for min-entropy n− 2δn can
be used as the required non-malleable extractor in the above theorem. The tampering function
h that is based on the communication protocol can be rephrased in terms of functions in the
following way. Suppose the protocol lasts for ℓ rounds, there exist deterministic functions fi and
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gi for i = 1, . . . , ℓ, and f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}2t → {0, 1}n and g : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}2t → {0, 1}n such
that the communication protocol between Alice and Bob corresponds to computing the following
random variables: S1 = f1(X),R1 = g1(Y,S1),S2 = f2(X,S1,R1), . . . ,Si = fi(X,S1, . . . ,Si−1,
R1, . . . ,Ri−1),Ri = gi(Y,S1, . . . ,Si,Ri,, . . . ,Ri−1), . . . ,Rℓ = gℓ(Y,S1, . . . ,Sℓ,R1, . . . ,Rℓ−1).
Finally, X′ = f(X,R1, . . . ,Rℓ,S1, . . . ,Sℓ) and Y′ = g(Y,R1, . . . ,Rℓ,S1, . . . ,Sℓ) correspond to
the output of Alice and the output of Bob respectively. Thus, h(X,Y) = (X′,Y′).
Similar to the way we argue about alternating extraction protocols, we fix random variables in
the following order: Fix S1, and it follows that R1 is now a deterministic function of Y. We fix
R1, and thus S2 is now a deterministic function of X. Thus, continuing in this way, we can fix all
the random variables S1, . . . ,Sℓ and R1, . . . ,Rℓ while maintaining that X and Y are independent.
Further, invoking Lemma 3.1, with probability at least 1−2−Ω(n), both X and Y have min-entropy
at least n− t− δn ≥ n− 2δn since both parties send at most t bits.
Note that now, X′ = η(X) for some deterministic function η and Y′ = ν(X) for some determin-
istic function ν. Thus, for any 2-source non-malleable extractor nmExt that works for min-entropy
n − 2δn with error ǫ, we have that there exists a distribution Dη,ν over {0, 1}m ∪ {same⋆} that is
independent of X and Y such that
|nmExt(X,Y),nmExt(η(X), ν(Y)) −Um, copy(Dη,ν ,Um)| ≤ ǫ+ .2−Ω(n)
The theorem now follows by plugging in such a construction from a recent work of Li ([Li18], Theo-
rem 1.12). We note the non-malleable extractor in [Li18] is indeed 2−Ω(n log logn/ logn)-invertible.
6 Efficient sampling algorithms
In this section, we provide efficient sampling algorithms for the seedless non-malleable extractor
construction presented in Section 4. This is crucial to get efficient encoding algorithms for the
corresponding non-malleable codes. We do not know how to invert the non-malleable extractor
constructions in Theorem 4.1, but we show that the constructions can suitably modified in a way
that admits efficient sampling from the pre-image of the extractor.
6.1 An invertible non-malleable extractor with respect to linear composed with
interleaved adversaries
The main idea is to ensure that on fixing appropriate random variables that are generated in
computing the non-malleable extractor, the source is now restricted onto a known subspace of fixed
dimension (i.e., the dimension does not depend on value of the fixed random variables). Once we
can ensure this, sampling from the pre-image can simply be done by first uniformly sampling the
fixed random variables, and then sampling the other variables uniformly from the known subspace.
To carry this out, we need an efficient construction of a linear seeded extractor that has the property
that for any fixing of the seed the linear map corresponding linear seeded extractor has the same
rank. Such a linear seeded extractor was constructed in prior works [CGL16,Li17] (see Theorem
3.13).
One additional care we need to take is the choice of the error correcting code we use in the
advice generator construction. We ensure that the linear constraints imposed by fixing the advice
string does not depend on the value of the advice string. This is subtle since the advice generator
comprises of a sample from an error correction of the sources as well as the output of a linear
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seeded extractor on the source. The basic idea is to remove a few sampled coordinates of the error
corrected sources and show that this suffices to remove any linear dependencies.
We use the following notation: For any linear map L : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}s given by L(α) = Mα
for some matrix M , we use conL to denote a maximal set of linearly independent rows of M .
We now set up some parameters and ingredients for our construction of an invertible non-
malleable extractor.
• Let δ > 0 be a small enough constant and C a large constant.
• Let δ′ = δ/C.
• Let C be a BCH code with parameters: [nb, nb− tb log nb, 2tb]2, tb = √nb/100, where we fix nb
in the following way. Let dBCH be the dual code. From standard literature, it follows that
dBCH is a [nb, tb log nb,
nb
2 − tb
√
nb]2-code. Set nb such that tb · log nb = √nb log nb = 2n. Let
E be the encoder of dBCH. Note that by our choice of parameters, the relative minimum
distance of dBCH is at least 1/3.
• Let n0 = nδ′ , n1 = nc00 , n2 = 10n0, for some constant c0 that we set below.
• Let n3 = nCδ, n4 = nC2δ/5, n5 = nC3δ, n6 = n−
∑5
i=1 ni. We ensure that n6 = n(2− o(1)).
• Let Ext1 : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}log(nb) be a (n1/20, 1/10)-seeded extractor instantiated
using Theorem 3.10. Thus d1 = c1 log n1, for some constant c1. Let D1 = 2
d1 = nc11 .
• Let Samp1 : {0, 1}n1 → [nb]D1 be the sampler obtained from Theorem 3.9 using Ext1.
• Let Ext2 : {0, 1}n2 × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}log(n6) be a (n2/20, 1/n0)-seeded extractor instantiated
using Theorem 3.10. Thus d2 = c2 log n2, for some constant c2. Let D2 = 2
d
2. Thus D2 =
2d2 = nc22 .
• Let Samp2 : {0, 1}n2 → [n6]D2 be the sampler obtained from Theorem 3.9 using Ext2.
• Set c0 = 2c2.
• Let iℓExt : {0, 1}D2 → {0, 1}n0 be the extractor from Theorem 7.1.
• Let LExt0 : {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}n0 → {0, 1}
√
n0 be a linear seeded extractor instantiated from
Theorem 3.15 set to extract from min-entropy n1/100 and error 2
−Ω(√n0).
• Let Ext3 : {0, 1}n3 × {0, 1}d3 → {0, 1}log(n6−D2) be a (n3/8, 1/100)-seeded extractor instanti-
ated using Theorem 3.10. Thus d3 = C1 log n3, for some constant C1.
• Let Samp3 : {0, 1}n3 → [n6 −D2]n7 be the sampler obtained from Theorem 3.9 using Ext3.
Thus n7 = 2
d3 = nC13 .
• Let Ext4 : {0, 1}n4 × {0, 1}d4 → {0, 1}n6−n7−D2 be a (n4/8, 1/100)-seeded extractor instanti-
ated using Theorem 3.10. Thus d3 = C1 log n4.
• Let Samp4 : {0, 1}n4 → [n5 − n7 − D2]n8 be the sampler obtained from Theorem 3.9 using
Ext4. Thus n8 = 2
d3 = nC14 .
• Let LExt1 : {0, 1}n5 ×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}d5 , d5 = √n5, be a linear-seeded extractor instantiated
from Theorem 3.11 set to extract from entropy k1 = n2/10 with error ǫ1 = 1/10. Thus
d = C2 log n5, for some constant C2. Let D = 2
d.
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• Let LExt2 : {0, 1}n7×{0, 1}d5 → {0, 1}m1 ,m1 = √n7 be a linear-seeded extractor instantiated
from Theorem 3.11 set to extract from entropy k2 = n7/100 with error ǫ2 = 2
−Ω(√d4) =
2−nΩ(1) , such that the seed length of the extractor LExt2 (by Theorem 3.11) is d5.
• Let ACB : {0, 1}n1,acb ×{0, 1}nacb ×{0, 1}hacb → {0, 1}n2,acb , be the advice correlation breaker
from Theorem 3.16 set with the following parameters: nacb = n7, n1,acb = m1, n2,acb = n9 =
D2, tacb = 2D,hacb = n
δ + d, ǫacb = 2
−nδ′ , dacb = O(log2(n/ǫacb)), λacb = 0. It can be checked
that by our choice of parameters, the conditions required for Theorem 3.16 indeed hold for
k1,acb ≥ nCδ.
• Let LExt3 : {0, 1}n8 × {0, 1}n9 → {0, 1}m be the linear seeded extractor from Theorem 3.13
set to extract from min-entropy rate 1/10 and error ǫ = 2−nΩ(1) (such that the seed-length is
indeed n9). Thus, m = αn9, for some small contant α that arises out of Theorem 3.13.
Algorithm 4: iℓNM(z)
Input: Bit-string z = (x ◦ y)π of length 2n, where x and y are each n bit-strings, and
π : [2n]→ [2n] is a permutation.
Output: Bit string of length m.
1 Let zi = z1 ◦ z2 ◦ z3 ◦ z4 ◦ z5 ◦ z6, where zi is of length ni.
2 Let Ti = Sampi(zi), i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
3 Let z2 = (z6)T2 .
4 Let z′2 = iℓExt(z2).
5 Let z′′2 = LExt0(z, z
′
2).
6 For any set Q ⊆ [2n], define the linear function E : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}|Q| as EQ(x) = (E(x))Q.
7 Pick a subset T1 ⊂ T1 of size D1 −√n0 such that conE
T1
is linearly independent of
conLExt0(·,z′2). If there is no such set T1, then output 0
m.
8 Let w = z1 ◦ z2 ◦ z2 ◦ (E(z))T1 ◦ z′′2 .
9 Let v be a D × d4 matrix, with its i’th row vi = LExt1(z5, i).
10 Let z′6 be the bits in z6 outside T2. Let z6 = (z
′
6)T3 .
11 Let r be a D × n4 matrix, with its i’th row ri = LExt2(z6, vi).
12 Let s be a D ×m matrix, with its i’th row si = ACB(ri, z6, w ◦ i).
13 Let s˜ = ⊕Di=1si.
14 Let z7 be the bits in z6 outside the coordinates T2 ∪ T3.
15 Let z7 = (z7)T4 . Let z8 be the bits in z6 outside the coordinates T2 ∪ T3 ∪ T4.
16 Output g = LExt3(z7, s˜).
Theorem 6.1. For all integers n > 0 there exists an explicit function nmExt : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}m,
m = nΩ(1), such that the following holds: For any linear function h : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}2n, arbitrary
tampering functions f, g ∈ Fn, any permutation π : [2n] → [2n] and independent uniform sources
X and Y each on n bits, there exists a distribution Dh,f,g,π on {0, 1}m ∪ {same⋆}, such that
|nmExt((X ◦Y)π),nmExt(h((f(X) ◦ g(Y))π))−Um, copy(Dh,f,g,π,Um)| ≤ 2−nΩ(1) .
The proof that iℓNM computed by Algorithm 4 satisfies Theorem 4.1 is very similar, and we
omit the details. We include a discussion of the key differences and subtleties that arise from the
modifications done in the above construction as compared to Algorithm 2.
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The first key difference is Step 7, where we discard some bits from the advice generator’s output.
The existence of the subset T 1 is guaranteed by the fact that E has dual distance tb = Ω(n/ log n).
Thus, for any T , it must be that ConET1 is a set of size |T1| = D1. Further, conLExt0(·,z′2) is a set
with cardinality at most
√
n0. Thus, indeed there exists such a set T 1. An important detail to
notice is that |T1 \ T1| = o(D1) and the distance of the code computed by E is Ω(1). Thus, the
fact that we discard the bits indexed by the set T1 \ T1 from the string E(Z)T1 (and thus from the
output of the advice generator) does not affect the correctness of the advice generator.
Another difference is that in the steps where we transform the somewhere random matrix v
into a matrix with longer rows, and the subsequent step where the advice correlation breaker is
applied is now done using a pseudorandomly sampled subset of coordinates from Z (as opposed to
the entire Z which we did before). It is not hard to prove that this does not make a difference as
long as we sample enough bits. Finally, another difference is the final step where we use a linear
seeded extractor, with Z6 as the seed. As done many times in the paper, we use the sum structure
of Z7 (into a source that depends on X and a source that depends on Y) along with the fact that
LExt3 is linear seeded to show that the output is close to uniform.
We now focus on the problem of efficiently sampling from the pre-image of this extractor. The
following lemma almost immediately implies a simple sampling algorithm.
Lemma 6.2. With probability 1−2−nΩ(1) over the fixing of the variables z1, z2, z2, z′′2 , z3, z4, z5, z6, w,
and any g ∈ {0, 1}m, the set iℓNM−1(g) is a linear subspace of fixed dimension.
Proof. Consider any fixing of z1, z2, z3, z4. Clearly, these fix the sets Ti, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Next,
note that given z2, we have the value of z
′
2. We note that by Lemma 3.14 that with probability
1− 2−nΩ(1) , the linear map LExt0(, z′2) has full rank. Using Algorithm 2, determine the set T1 (if it
exists). Fix E(z)T 1 and z
′′
2 , noting that the value of w is now determined. Now given z5, z6, we can
compute r, s, s˜. Next observe that given g and s˜, Theorem 3.13 implies the value of z7 belongs to
a subspace whose dimension does not depend on the values of g and s˜. Finally, we are left to see
how to compute z8. Note that the constraints on z8 are imposed by the fixings of z
′′
2 and E(C)T1 .
However, by construction (Step 7 of our algorithm), the number of independent linear constraints
on z8 is exactly equal to D1 as long as LExt0(, z
′
2) has full rank (which as noted before occurs with
probability at least 1− 2−nΩ(1)). This completes the proof.
Given Lemma 6.2, the sampling algorithm is now straightforward:
Input g ∈ {0, 1}m; Output z that is uniform on the set iℓNM−1(g).
1. Sample zi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 uniformly at random. Compute T1, T2, T3, T4 following Algorithm 2.
2. Sample z2 uniformly, and compute z
′
2. Further, sample z
′′
2 uniformly.
3. Compute T1, and sample (E(z))T1 uniformly at random.
4. Compute w, v, r, s, s˜ using Algorithm 2.
5. Sample z7 from (LExt3(·, s˜))−1(g) efficiently using Theorem 3.13.
6. Sample z8 as described in Lemma 6.2. Compute the string z6.
7. Output z = z1 ◦ z2 ◦ z3 ◦ z4 ◦ z5 ◦ z6.
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7 Extractors for interleaved sources
Our techniques yield improved explicit constructions of extractors for interleaved sources. Our
extractor works when both sources have entropy at least 2n/3, and outputs Ω(n) bits that are
2−nΩ(1)-close to uniform.
The following is our main result.
Theorem 7.1. For any constant δ > 0 and all integers n > 0, there exists an efficiently computable
function iℓExt : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}m, m = Ω(n), such that for any two independent sources X and
Y, each on n bits with min-entropy at least (2/3 + δ)n, and any permutation π : [2n] → [2n], we
have
|iℓExt((X ◦Y)π)−Um| ≤ 2−nΩ(1) .
We use the rest of the section to prove Theorem 7.1. An important ingredient in our construction
is an explicit somewhere condenser for high-entropy sources constructed in the works of Barak et
al. [BRSW12] and Zuckerman [Zuc07].
Theorem 7.2. For all constants β, δ and all integers n > 0, there exists an efficiently computable
function Con : {0, 1}n ×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}ℓ, d = 0(1) and ℓ = Ω(n) such that the following holds: for
any (n, δn)-source X there exists a y ∈ {0, 1}d such that Con(X, y) is 2−Ω(n)-close to a source with
min-entropy (1− β)ℓ.
We call such a function Con to be a (δ, 1 − β)-condenser.
We prove that Algorithm 5 computes the required extractor. We begin by setting up some
ingredients and parameters.
• Let κ > 0 be a small enough constant.
• Let n1 = (2/3 + δ/2)n and n2 = n5κ.
• Let β be a parameter which we fix later. Let Con : {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}ℓ be a (δ/4,
1 − β)-condenser instantiated from Theorem 7.2. Thus ℓ = n/C ′, for some constant C ′ that
depends on δ, β. Let D = 2d. Note that D = O(1).
• Let LExt1 : {0, 1}2n×{0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}n2 be the linear seeded extractor from Theorem 3.13 set
to extract from min-entropy rate 1/12 and error ǫ1 = 2
−2βℓ. The seed-length is at most 3Cβℓ,
some constant C that arises out of Theorem 3.13. We choose β = min{1/3C, γ}, where γ is
the constant in Theorem 3.13. Note that the seed-length of LExt1 is indeed at most ℓ.
• Let ACB : {0, 1}n1,acb ×{0, 1}nacb ×{0, 1}hacb → {0, 1}n2,acb , be the advice correlation breaker
from Theorem 3.16 set with the following parameters: nacb = 2n, n1,acb = n2, n2,acb = n3 =
n2κ, tacb = D,hacb = d, ǫacb = 2
−nκ , dacb = O(log2(n/ǫacb)), λacb = 0. It can be checked
that by our choice of parameters, the conditions required for Theorem 3.16 indeed hold for
k1,acb ≥ n2κ.
• Let LExt2 : {0, 1}2n×{0, 1}n3 → {0, 1}m, m = Ω(n), be a linear-seeded extractor instantiated
from Theorem 3.11 set to extract from entropy k1 = n/10 with error ǫ1 = 2
−α√n3 , for an
appropriately picked small constant α.
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Algorithm 5: iℓExt(z)
Input: Bit-string z = (x ◦ y)π of length 2n, where x and y are each n bit-strings, and
π : [2n]→ [2n] is a permutation.
Output: Bit string of length m.
1 Let z1 = Slice(z, n1).
2 Let v be a D × n2 matrix, with its i’th row vi = Con(z1, i).
3 Let r be a D × n3 matrix, with its i’th row ri = LExt1(z, vi).
4 Let s be a D ×m matrix, with its i’th row si = ACB(ri, z, i).
5 Let s˜ = ⊕Di=1si.
6 Output LExt2(z, s˜).
We use the following notation: Let X1 be the bits of X in Z1 and X2 be the remaining bit of
X. Let Y1 be the bits of Y in Z1 and Y2 be the remaining bits of Y. Without loss of generality
assume |X1| ≥ |Y1|. Define X = (X ◦ 0n)π and Y = (Y ◦ 0n)π. Further, let X1 = Slice(X, n1) and
Y1 = Slice(Y, n1). It follows that Z = X+Y, and Z1 = X1+Y1. Further, let kx = ky = (2/3+δ)n.
We begin by proving the following claim.
Claim 7.3. Conditioned on the random variables X1,Y1, {LExt1(X,Con(X1 + Y1, i))}Di=1, the
following hold:
• the matrix R is 2−Ω(n)-close to a somewhere random source,
• R is a deterministic functions of Y,
• H∞(X) ≥ δn/4, H∞(Y) ≥ n/6.
Proof. By construction, we have that for any j ∈ [D],
Rj = LExt1(Z,Con(Z1, j))
= LExt1(X+Y,Con(X1 +Y1, j))
= LExt2(X,Con(X1 +Y1, j)) + LExt2(Y,Con(X1 +Y1, j))
Fix the random variables Y1, and Y has min-entropy at least ky − n1/2 ≥ n/6 + 3δn/4. Further,
note that X1 has min-entropy at least n1/2 − (n − kx) ≥ δn/4. Now, by Theorem 7.2, we know
that there exists a j ∈ [D] such that Con(X1 +Y1, j) is 2−Ω(n)-close to a source with min-entropy
at least (1− β)ℓ. Further, note that V is a deterministic function of X.
Now, since LExt1 is a strong seeded extractor set to extract from min-entropy n/6, it follows
that
|LExt1(Y,Con(X1 +Y1, j)) −Un2 | ≤ 2βℓǫ1 + 2−Ω(n) ≤ 2−βℓ+1.
We now fix the random variables X1 and note that LExt1(Y,Con(X1 + Y1, j)) continues to
be 2−Ω(ℓ)-close to Un2 . This follows from the fact that LExt1 is a strong seeded extractor. Note
that the random variables {Con(X1 + Y1, i)) : i ∈ [D]} are now fixed. Next, fix the random
variables {LExt1(X,Con(X1+Y1, i))}Di=1 noting that they are deterministic functions of X. Thus
Rj is 2
−Ω(n)-close to Un2 and for any i ∈ [D], the random variables Ri are deterministic functions
of Y. Finally, note that X and Y remain independent after these conditionings, and H∞(X) ≥
kx − n1 −Dn2 and H∞(Y) ≥ ky − n1/2.
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The next claim almost gets us to Theorem 7.1.
Claim 7.4. There exists j ∈ [D] such that
Sj, {Si}i∈[D]\j ,X ≈2−nΩ(1) Un3 , {Si}i∈[D]\j ,X.
Proof. Fix the random variables: X1,Y1, {LExt1(X,Con(X1 +Y1, i))}Di=1. By Claim 7.3 we have
that R is a deterministic function of Y, and with probability at least 1−2−Ω(n), there exists j ∈ [D]
such that Rj is 2
−nΩ(1)-close to uniform, and H∞(X) ≥ δn/4. Recall that Z = X + Y. It now
follows by Theorem 3.16 that
ACB(Rj ,Z,W ◦ j), {ACB(Ri,X+Y,W ◦ i)}i∈[D]\j ,X ≈2−nΩ(1)
Un3 , {ACB(Ri,X+Y,W ◦ i)}i∈[D]\j ,X.
It follows by Claim 7.4 that S˜ is 2−n
Ω(1)
-close to uniform even conditioned on X. Thus, noting
that LExt2(Z, S˜) = LExt2(X, S˜) + LExt2(Y, S˜), it follows that we can fix S˜ and LExt2(X, S˜)
remains 2−nΩ(1)-close to uniform and is a deterministic function of X. Next, we fix LExt2(Y, S˜)
without affecting the distribution of LExt2(X, S˜). It follows that LExt2(Z, S˜) is 2
−nΩ(1) -close to
uniform. This completes the proof of Theorem 7.1.
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